Trump & Trade: From Greenland to the Supreme Court
Analysis and insights from global trade expert and Bradshaw Senior Advisor - Sir Crawford Falconer.
Last week marked one year since Donald Trump’s inauguration as the 47th President of the United States. Over the past year, his administration has significantly disrupted the global trade agenda — introducing broad tariffs on imports, advancing an “America First” agenda, and pulling the United States away from multilateral institutions, including the World Trade Organisation. His latest tirade involved driving a wedge between European and NATO allies over Greenland.
Trump’s tariff threat against NATO partners
Last weekend, Trump outlined his latest threat against the UK, Denmark and other NATO partners, vowing to impose new tariffs against allies who oppose his ambition to acquire Greenland. If implemented, new 10% tariffs on “all or any goods” would have taken effect from February 1st, with a further escalation to 25% scheduled for the 1st of June.
While Trump framed these measures as necessary for global security — citing threats to Greenland from China and Russia and warning that “world peace is at stake” — the proposal was widely regarded as undermining the sovereignty of Denmark, the people of Greenland, and the collective security framework of NATO.
Trump provided conveniently provided himself a two-week window before the new tariffs would take effect. This ‘wiggle-room’ created space for behind-the-scenes diplomacy. I spoke at length about how the UK and Europe should respond to Trump’s veiled threat during interviews with a range of media outlets including Times Radio, Sky News and BBC Radio 5 Live.
Last week was a critical week for the transatlantic alliance and the wider international order. While negotiation took place during the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting in Davos, with a ‘framework of a deal’ secured between the US and NATO, Trump’s latest outburst demonstrates the value of deeper UK integration with our European counterparts to challenge the use of coercive economic measures and protect the benefits of open and global trade.
US Supreme Court ruling on Trump’s IEEPA tariffs
Next month, we expect to hear from the US Supreme Court on its judgment on the legality of certain US tariff measures, those imposed under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) last year. This may implicate how the President drives US trade policy in 2026.
Of course, the court is not bound to make a straight binary decision and could present any ruling as a ‘halfway house’ rather than say all the measures are invalid or upholding all of them as legal. If they go down this route, it may be a while before it becomes clear as to what exactly the court has vacated with the Administration’s application of IEEPA tariffs.
Second, even if the Court strikes down (i.e. rules as illegal) the trade measures, it may not give clarity on refunds of the existing tariffs. They may choose to remain silent on that, or they may remand it to lower courts to sort out. This could result in a long and potentially complicated process for importers to get refunds. Although, refunds are unlikely.
There are four broad principles to keep in mind depending on the verdict, in addition to thinking about what the President may do in response:
1. Limits on presidential authority
At the heart of the case is whether the Court is prepared to place meaningful limits on the President’s ability to impose tariffs under delegated statutory powers. A decision that narrows executive discretion would be legally significant, but it should not be read as removing tariff risk altogether.
2. Congressional versus executive control
The Court may use the judgment to re-emphasise Congress’s constitutional role over trade and taxation. Even if the tariffs fall, any language suggesting that Congress must more actively authorise or oversee trade measures would shape US trade policy only gradually - and would not prevent swift executive action in the near term.
3. Willingness of the courts to intervene
Of equal importance is whether the Court signals a greater readiness to review the substance of trade decisions, rather than deferring automatically to the executive.
4. Market and operational implications
For business, the immediate question will be whether the judgment creates exposure for existing tariff regimes, disrupts supply-chain assumptions, or introduces new volatility into US trade policy at short notice.
If tariffs are struck down, what are the likely alternative routes?
Even if the Court invalidates the specific measures under challenge, it is important to be clear that the Trump Administration could use several alternative mechanisms to re-impose tariffs, potentially very quickly (although, USTR haven’t yet got around to thinking much about plan B and what these might be):
National security powers (Section 232):
Tariffs can be re-introduced following a Commerce Department investigation framed around national security. This route has historically been resilient to judicial challenge and could be targeted at specific sectors.
Unfair trade remedies (Section 301):
The administration could revive or expand tariffs in response to alleged unfair trading practices, particularly involving China. This mechanism is slower but legally well-trodden.
Section 122 of the 1974 trade act:
This is a power to apply a 15 percent tariff but it has to be applied to everyone and it only lasts 150 days. But some experts believe it could be extended if only to buy time for the Administration to sort a rejigged arrangement
Section 338 of the 1930 tariff act:
This is a power to impose tariffs up to 50 per cent on a country deemed to be discriminating against the US. It has never been used but some experts believe that it can be used and, although some investigation is required, the Administration need not wait for any outcome from it.
Non-tariff barriers with tariff-like effect:
Quotas, licensing requirements, customs enforcement measures, or product-specific standards can be deployed to similar commercial effect, often with less visibility than headline tariffs.
Targeted sectoral action:
Rather than broad-based tariffs, the Administration may opt for narrower, politically salient sectoral measures (e.g. autos, steel, critical minerals), increasing risk for specific business lines rather than whole economies.
International and strategic signalling
Finally, the judgment will be read closely by US allies and trading partners. A legal rebuke to unilateral tariff action may be stabilising in the medium term, but businesses should assume continued policy volatility.
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